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Work–Family Policy
Trade-Offs for
Mothers? Unpacking
the Cross-National
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Motherhood Earnings
Penalties
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Abstract
Recent scholarship suggests welfare state interventions, as measured by
policy indices, create gendered trade-offs wherein reduced work–family
conflict corresponds to greater gender wage inequality. The authors recon-
sider these trade-offs by unpacking these indices and examining specific
policy relationships with motherhood-based wage inequality to consider
how different policies have different effects. Using original policy data and
Luxembourg Income Study microdata, multilevel models across 22 countries
examine the relationships among country-level family policies, tax policies,
and the motherhood wage penalty. The authors find policies that maintain
maternal labor market attachment through moderate-length leaves, publicly
funded childcare, lower marginal tax rates on second earners, and paternity
leave are correlated with smaller motherhood wage penalties.
Work and Occupations
2016, Vol. 43(2) 119–177
! The Author(s) 2015
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0730888415615385
wox.sagepub.com
1University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA
2WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Michelle J. Budig, Department of Sociology, University of Massachusetts, 7th Floor Thompson
Hall, 200 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA 01003-9277, USA.
Email: budig@soc.umass.edu
Keywords
family, women, earnings, social policy
Gendered economic inequality persists among welfare states, despite a
wide range of work–family policies ostensibly aimed at addressing these
inequalities (Budig & England, 2001; Charles, 2011; Charles & Grusky,
2004; Gornick & Meyers, 2003; Mandel & Semyonov, 2005, 2006; Pettit
& Hook, 2009; Yaish & Stier, 2009). Previous research suggests that
these policies may either ameliorate or exacerbate the degree of gender
economic inequality (Abendroth, Huﬀman, & Treas, 2014; Korpi,
Ferrarini, & Englund, 2009; Mandel, 2009; Mandel & Semyonov,
2005, 2006; Orloﬀ, 1993; Pettit & Hook, 2005, 2009). Most scholars
now view work–family policies as not either entirely good or bad, but
leading to trade-oﬀs, which reﬂect diversity in outcomes (education,
labor force participation, occupation, wages, poverty, etc.) and in
women’s experiences—by parenthood, class, and other characteristics.
For example, transfers for caregivers may reduce gender inequality in
the risk of poverty while increasing gender inequality in wages by low-
ering mothers’ accumulated experience. To understand whether and
how work–family policies create trade-oﬀs for mothers’ earnings, we
compare the earnings of women with varying numbers of children to
show the relationship between the wage penalty for motherhood and
speciﬁc work–family policies.
While some researchers see state interventions as increasing women’s
employment and wages (Gornick & Meyers, 2003), others suggest that
these interventions lead to trade-oﬀs for women in the form of lower
employment or greater gender pay gaps (Mandel, 2009; Mandel &
Semyonov, 2005, 2006; Pettit & Hook, 2009). Many of the work–
family policies considered important to explaining gender inequalities
speciﬁcally target motherhood. There is growing heterogeneity among
women with respect to parenthood and labor market behaviors.
Research on the impact of children on women’s earnings, or the mother-
hood penalty, shows signiﬁcant economic inequality among women
related to motherhood and the number of children (Abendroth et al.,
2014; Budig & England, 2001; Budig & Hodges, 2010; Gangl & Zieﬂe,
2009; Harkness & Waldfogel, 2003; Joshi, Paci, & Waldfogel, 1999;
Waldfogel, 1997, 1998a, 1998b). This body of research deﬁnes the
motherhood penalty as the amount each additional child lowers
women’s earnings.
120 Work and Occupations 43(2)
Judging the eﬀectiveness of state interventions, then, means that we
must understand not simply whether they reduce gender inequality but
whether they reduce inequality among women with varying numbers of
children. Thus, focusing on gender gaps between the typical woman and
the average man misses the variation among women in regard to the
impact of speciﬁc work–family interventions (maternity leave, public
childcare, etc.) on labor force participation and earnings. To more
clearly understand how state interventions shape the impact of
women’s responsibilities for children on their labor market outcomes,
we focus our analysis on women to examine the association of work–
family policies with the size of the motherhood earnings penalty (the
eﬀect of each additional child on a woman’s earnings, controlling for
other factors) in 22 countries. In this way, we move the literature
beyond a broad comparison of gender diﬀerences to a sharper focus
on state interventions, motherhood, and market work.
Our article brings together two major literatures. One is focused on
the motherhood penalty or the negative eﬀect of each additional child
on women’s earnings. The second is focused on gendered welfare state
outcomes, and in particular, the complex, and perhaps contradictory
eﬀects of welfare state policies on outcomes for women and mothers.
We bridge these literatures to more fully explore the complex intersec-
tions of state, family, and markets in contemporary welfare states
(O’Connor, Orloﬀ, & Shaver, 1999). Our central contributions are
threefold: First, we focus on the earnings consequences of motherhood,
rather than gender, across 22 countries to understand how country-level
work–family policies speciﬁcally shape the motherhood earnings pen-
alty. Second, we break with the comparative regime approach to exam-
ine how particular work–family policies are related to the size of
motherhood penalties in varying country sociopolitical contexts.
Third, we unpack the welfare state trade-oﬀs debate by disaggregating
work–family policies to identify policies that are associated with greater
or smaller motherhood wage penalties. Our aim is to develop an inte-
grated, and more nuanced, understanding of these relationships among
families, markets, and states.
Earnings Penalties for Motherhood
It is well established that children are linked to reduced earnings for
women in most wealthy countries (Abendroth et al., 2014; Anderson,
Binder, & Krause, 2003; Avellar & Smock, 2003; Budig & England,
2001; Budig & Hodges, 2010; Davies & Pierre, 2005; Gangl & Zieﬂe,
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2009; Glauber, 2007; Harkness & Waldfogel, 2003; Joshi & Newell,
1989; Joshi et al., 1999; Lundberg & Rose, 2000; Waldfogel, 1997,
1998a, 1998b). Previous cross-national work suggests substantial vari-
ations in the size of these penalties (Davies & Pierre, 2005; Gangl &
Zieﬂe, 2009; Harkness & Waldfogel, 2003), although we know less
about the impacts of welfare state policies on the size of these penalties.
Analytically, examining how these processes diﬀer cross-nationally,
while controlling for individual-level diﬀerences, allows us to theorize
how societal context matters for labor market outcomes (Fernandez-
Macias, 2012; Yaish & Stier, 2009), such as the motherhood penalty. A
wide range of scholarship explores labor market processes and inequal-
ity cross-nationally (DiPrete, 2005; Ebbinghaus & Kittel, 2005;
Fernandez-Macias, 2012; Gangl, 2005; Hancke & Rhodes, 2005;
Maurin & Postel-Vinay, 2005) to suggest that meaningful diﬀerences
can be attributed to variations in labor market institutions. Other schol-
arship examines how diﬀering societal contexts shape the work–family
nexus, including wage eﬀects (Abendroth et al., 2014; Charles & Grusky,
2004; Edlund, 2007; Gornick & Meyers, 2003; Mandel & Semyonov,
2005, 2006; Pettit & Hook, 2009; Ruppanner & Huﬀman, 2014).
The motherhood wage penalty estimates how much less women earn
for each additional child they have. The individual-level mechanisms
that produce this penalty have been extensively studied (Anderson
et al., 2003; Avellar & Smock, 2003; Budig & England, 2001; Budig &
Hodges, 2010; Gangl & Zieﬂe, 2009; Glauber, 2007; Lundberg & Rose,
2000; Waldfogel, 1997, 1998a, 1998b). These studies show that the total,
or gross, motherhood penalty can be partially explained by foregone
work experience due to childbirth interruptions, ﬁrm changes following
employment reentrance, and part-time work hours, among others.1 Yet,
contextual factors, including work–family and other policies, mitigate
the extent to which motherhood impacts women’s employment. Both
individual- and country-level factors shape the motherhood penalty. We
detail these multilevel pathways in Figure 1. In this ﬁgure, pathways
between factors empirically proven to aﬀect the motherhood penalty are
shown as solid lines. Dashed lines represent the pathways we investigate
in the current study. Through a series of nested multilevel regression
models, we show how individual diﬀerences among women (Level 1)
partially account for the motherhood earnings penalty, as measured by
number of children in the home. At Level 2, we examine the relationship
between the per-child motherhood earnings penalty (net of individual
and household characteristics) and measures that capture country-level
policies salient for employed mothers.
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Public Policies and Motherhood Earnings Penalties
A range of societal-level factors may account for the negative impact
of children on women’s earnings. We focus on those interventions
that address how families and markets intersect. For example, work–
family policies include maternity and parental leave and subsidized or
state-provided childcare—policies meant to help ensure that par-
ents can balance care and employment. Taxation policies may
either reward or penalize dual-earner couples, further aﬀecting how
couples make choices regarding employment, although tax eﬀects
may equally apply for childless couples. We explore whether these
policies might be associated with variations in earnings penalties
cross-nationally.
Welfare state scholarship has explored whether policies aimed at
women’s reconciling employment with care—such as leaves and child-
care—have perhaps unintentionally disadvantaged women, or groups of
women, or led to trade-oﬀs (Albrecht, Bjorklund, & Vroman, 2003;
Charles & Grusky, 2004; Glass & Fodor, 2011; Mandel, 2009;
Mandel & Semyonov, 2005, 2006; Pettit & Hook, 2009; Yaish &
Stier, 2009). Counter to expectations that work–family policies would
support women’s employment and ameliorate inequality (Gash, 2009;
Gornick & Meyers, 2003), these policies may, themselves, undermine
women’s—and particularly mothers’—employment. Much of this litera-
ture focuses on broad gender gaps between men and women, rather than
looking more particularly at diﬀerences among women and mothers.
Yet, whether these policies are friend or foe to mothers may depend
on the outcomes measured (Bianchi & Milkie, 2010; Mandel, 2009).
Thus, paid parental leaves may maintain family ﬁnances while also
weakening mothers’ employment—serving as both friend and foe. If
we focus on one particular outcome, such as mothers’ employment,
diﬀerent policies may have diﬀerent eﬀects. For example, publicly
funded childcare may support mothers’ employment, reducing employ-
ment diﬀerences among women. In contrast, long parental leaves may
weaken mothers’ attachment to the labor force, increasing the mother-
hood penalty through foregone experience (Boeckmann, Misra, &
Budig, 2015).
Many scholars contend that work–family policies increase women’s
employment and wages, by helping them balance the demands of both
family and work, and make this argument by comparing broad welfare
state regimes (Daly, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Gornick & Meyers,
2003; Korpi, 2000; Orloﬀ, 2002). A limitation of this comparative case
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approach is that it is diﬃcult to disentangle policy eﬀects with other
country-level diﬀerences in, for example, culture or broader earn-
ings inequality. Moreover, the regime framework mutes within-regime
variation on these dimensions. To better model individual outcomes
and country-level eﬀects, researchers have used multilevel modeling
strategies with larger samples of countries to examine gendered pol-
icy outcomes (Boeckmann et al., 2015; Mandel & Semyonov,
2005, 2006).
By using an index of work–family policies that include public sector
employment, leaves, and childcare, Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006)
argue that positive outcomes are not guaranteed; instead, there are
important trade-oﬀs worth considering. But a limitation of this policy
index approach is the diversity of the work–family policies summarized
in such indices.2 Some policies, such as extended parental leaves, may
have markedly diﬀerent eﬀects on maternal employment and earnings
than other policies, such as high-quality publicly subsidized childcare.
Despite this diversity, scholars often have subsumed an array of policies
into an overall index to assess their impact on employment and earnings
(Gornick, Meyers, & Ross, 1997; Mandel & Semyonov, 2005). We
adopt a multilevel approach modeling these policies separately because
we believe that they may reﬂect diﬀerent gendered assumptions about
women’s and mothers’ roles.
What policies and other contextual factors may inﬂuence the
motherhood penalty? We identify at least three factors that may inﬂu-
ence mothers’ abilities to combine work and care, and therein
impact their ability to maintain employment and job experience accrual:
(a) the prevalence of publicly funded childcare, (b) the duration and
beneﬁts levels of maternity and parental leave policies, and (c)
the eﬀect of taxation policies on the net pay of the second earner
(Evans, 2002; Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001; Gornick & Meyers,
2003; Jaumotte, 2003a; Morgan & Zippel, 2003; Pettit & Hook,
2005, 2009).
We examine these policies separately because diﬀerent gendered
assumptions may underlie them; for example, extended parental care
policies may be undergirded by an assumption that mothers should
directly care for children at home, while publicly funded childcare
policy may reﬂect an assumption that women should be able to
pursue paid employment when children are young. Korpi et al. (2009)
similarly note that within countries, there may be “competing values
and conﬂicting goals concerning relationships between women, men,
and families” (p. 3). Because policies are the results of historical
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processes in which multiple actors and societal groups may have a say,
diﬀerent policies within countries may embrace diﬀerent values or goals
(Morgan, 2005; Morgan & Zippel, 2003). For these reasons, it is import-
ant to consider diﬀerent state interventions independently.
A generalized index that combines policies that alternately promote or
deter paid employment among new mothers may therefore obscure
policy eﬀects on their employment outcomes (Korpi et al., 2009). By
analyzing policies separately and focusing on diﬀerences among women,
we consider the eﬀects of diﬀerent state interventions on earnings in a
more nuanced way. We also consider policy combinations by investigat-
ing whether tax policies regarding the second earner’s income have
stronger or weaker eﬀects once we account for childcare and parental
leave policies.
Childcare policies. Childcare policies might impact cross-national diﬀer-
ences in mothers’ earnings through enabling more continuous employ-
ment when children are very young (McDonald, 2000). While childcare
programs were adopted both to educate children and to support par-
ents’ employment, programs for children under 3 are explicitly recog-
nized as helping families balance care and employment (Gornick &
Meyers, 2003; Kamerman & Kahn, 1991). In addition, childcare costs
are strongly correlated with women’s employment. Han and Waldfogel
(2002) argue that in the United States, reducing childcare costs to par-
ents could substantially raise employment of both married and single
mothers. Because government funding and subsidies tend to reduce the
cost of childcare to parents while keeping the quality of care high
(Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD],
2001), we focus on publicly supported, rather than market-based, child-
care. Cross-nationally, Pettit and Hook (2005, 2009) show that high
levels of childcare are positively linked with women’s labor market par-
ticipation, while Abendroth et al. (2014) show an association between
lower penalties and investment in public childcare. This leads us to
predict Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of children enrolled in government-provided
or -subsidized childcare should be negatively related to the earnings penalty
by allowing mothers to remain more continuously in paid employment,
and therein minimize lost job experience. We use separate measures for
policies that apply to infants (5age 3) and those that apply to preschoolers
(ages 3 to 6).
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Leave policies. Leave policies (i.e., maternity, paternity, and parental
leave)3 are meant to support temporary caregiving while allowing par-
ents to return to the same or equivalent job. We consider both beneﬁt
levels of leaves and duration of leave. Beneﬁt levels matter because very
low-paid leaves may be less eﬀective than well-paid leaves, with families
unable to take advantage of the leave. The duration of leave may also
have varying associations with the motherhood penalty. For example,
very long parental leaves could decrease mothers’ employment continu-
ity and increase lost job experience and penalty for motherhood
(Morgan & Zippel, 2003; Pettit & Hook, 2005, 2009) by reducing
labor force attachment. Moreover, the prospect of mothers’ prolonged
absence from work might discourage employers from hiring or promot-
ing young women and mothers (Glass & Fodor, 2011). Yet, the absence
of statutory leave entitlements may also increase the motherhood pen-
alty by forcing women to exit the workforce during the child’s early
years of life, and therein reducing job experience and making
mothers less attractive to employers as long-term workers. In contrast,
moderate job-protected leaves may help mothers maintain labor force
attachment and encourage timely returns to employment, thus minimiz-
ing productivity costs to employers and mitigating lost job experience
related to maternity. Indeed, studies show curvilinear eﬀects of leave
length on women’s employment outcomes and poverty (Boeckmann
et al., 2015; Evertsson & Duvander, 2010; Kenworthy, 2008; Pettit &
Hook, 2005, 2009).
Hypothesis 2a: Paid leaves should be negatively associated with mother-
hood penalties.
We measure paid leaves as (a) number of fully paid weeks of maternity
leave and (b) number of fully paid weeks of parental leave.
Hypothesis 2b: The duration of parental care leaves should matter for lost
job experience and employer tenure and will not be captured in the cal-
culated number of weeks of fully paid parental care leaves above. Thus,
we predict that the duration of care leave, regardless of beneﬁt level,
should have curvilinear associations with the motherhood penalty.
No or very short leaves will be linked to higher motherhood penalties.
Moderate leaves should decrease the motherhood penalty. In contrast,
very long leaves (e.g., 2 to 3 years) should increase the motherhood
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penalty. We measure duration of women’s leaves in terms of the max-
imum number of job-protected weeks of leave available to women
(regardless of availability and level of beneﬁts), including a squared
term for leave length to model curvilinear eﬀects. We also test for
cubed and higher order transformations of leave length to detect and
model curvilinear eﬀects.
Taxation policies. Income taxation policies inﬂuence the amount of dis-
posable income available to families and may shape (married) women’s
decisions about employment (Sainsbury, 1999). Notably, in many coun-
tries, second earners’ incomes are taxed more heavily than single earners
(Jaumotte, 2003b for 2000/2001), which may provide a disincentive to
women to take up (full-time) employment. Given the complexity of tax
systems, in which the tax burden may depend on multiple factors,4 the
body of literature examining the relationship between income tax poli-
cies and women’s employment participation has not lead to conclusive
results (Sainsbury, 1999; van der Lippe & van Dijk, 2002). However,
studies show that tax disadvantages to second earners tend to be related
to lower female employment participation. For example, Jaumotte
(2003a) ﬁnds that in a sample of 17 OECD countries, higher ratios
between the tax rates of a second earner in a coupled household and
a single earner (who both earn 67% of the average production worker’s
earnings) are inversely related to women’s employment rates. Sainsbury
(1999) concludes that tax policies help explain lower female employment
participation in European welfare states where the tax systems imposed
considerable penalties on working wives’ incomes. Here, we examine tax
disincentives to partnered women’s employment, who make up the
majority of our sample. By inﬂuencing women’s labor market attach-
ment, tax policies may shape the earnings penalties connected with
motherhood.
Hypothesis 3: Taxation policies that penalize second earner’s incomes in
coupled households should be positively correlated with higher mother-
hood earnings penalties by discouraging (partnered) women’s labor
market participation when children are small resulting in interrupted
attachment to the labor market and reduced experience due to
childbearing.
Yet, we consider this a fairly conservative test, given that taxation poli-
cies may also lower partnered childless women’s labor market partici-
pation, resulting in part-time work or reduced experience.
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In addition to considering how speciﬁc policies are related to the
motherhood penalty, we also examine the resilience of policies aimed
at supporting women’s capacity to care for children and remain
employed (job-protected leaves and publicly funded childcare) when
we include tax rate policies that make the second earner’s wages more
or less valuable to the family economy.
We use a multilevel modeling strategy to control for the individual-
level factors known to partially explain the motherhood earnings
penalty and simultaneously estimate how country-level factors alter
net penalties for children. Our modeling strategy allows us to consider
how policies meant to mediate family responsibilities are associated with
the wages of women with diﬀering responsibilities for care. Our goal is
to assess the eﬀects of state interventions on inequalities linked to gen-
dered caregiving. By unpacking welfare state policy indices into speciﬁc
policy measures, we expect our work to adjudicate debates in the welfare
state literature regarding whether such interventions create a paradox
(Mandel & Semyonov, 2005, 2006) or trade-oﬀ (Mandel, 2009; Pettit &
Hook, 2009) while also addressing assumptions in the motherhood pen-
alty literature regarding how contexts may explain variations in mother-
hood penalties. As a result, we specify how state interventions in the
intersection of families and markets matter to wage inequality among
women.
Controls for Individual-Level Factors on Earnings Penalties
for Motherhood
While we focus on how work–family policies condition the relationship
between family and the market for women, we ﬁrst ensure that we are
controlling for factors that may partially explain the motherhood earn-
ings penalty at the individual level. This is because these individual
factors—such as mothers’ educational attainment—may diﬀer from
country to country, while our aim is to capture the policy eﬀects
rather than such diﬀerences across populations.
A large body of research has established the impact of children on
women’s earnings and the individual-level factors that shape this rela-
tionship (Anderson et al., 2003; Avellar & Smock, 2003; Budig &
England, 2001; Budig & Hodges, 2010; Lundberg & Rose, 2000; Sigle-
Rushton & Waldfogel, 2004; Waldfogel, 1998a, 1998b). First, family
structure and household resources aﬀect the motherhood penalty. In
the United States, married women incur larger penalties for mother-
hood in the United States (Budig & England, 2001; Budig & Hodges,
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2010; Glauber, 2007), while gross motherhood penalties are larger for
single women in some countries, while in still others, there is no diﬀer-
ence between single and married or partnered5 mothers (Gangl & Zieﬂe,
2009; Killewald & Gough, 2013). In addition to partnered status, other
household income, including partners’ earnings and transfer income
from the state or private sources, may impact women’s decisions to
engage in paid labor, and therein aﬀect the motherhood penalty.
Human capital and work eﬀort (measured by labor supply) pro-
foundly shape the motherhood penalty. Smaller or no penalties are
found among the highly educated, both in the United States
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Kimmel, 2005; Anderson et al., 2003;
Taniguchi, 1999) and cross-nationally (Todd, 2001). In addition,
mothers’ lower labor supply, measured as hours worked or part-time
status, explains an additional portion of the penalty for children (Budig
& England, 2001; Waldfogel, 1997), but a signiﬁcant penalty remains
even after controls for human capital and labor supply are added.
Lost job experience due to breaks for childbearing is one of the major
mechanisms negatively aﬀecting mothers’ earnings trajectories. Women
with (more) children typically have less experience and seniority due to
the employment breaks taken to accommodate childrearing, and this
explains one third to over one half of the motherhood earnings penalty
(Budig & England, 2001; Klerman & Liebowitz, 1999; Staﬀ & Mortimer,
2012). Lost experience explains more of the penalty (50%) among highly
paid skilled workers where returns to experience are stronger (Budig &
Hodges, 2010). While the microdata used in this study do not include a
consistent measure of job experience for the 22 countries we analyze, even
if possible, such a measure would be endogenous to the model. Many of
the state interventions that are associated with the size of the motherhood
penalty operate through their impact on the amount of job experience
women lose following childbirth or adoption.
Furthermore, diﬀerences in the motherhood earnings penalty across
countries could be due to diﬀerential selection of mothers into employ-
ment across countries. Mothers’ employment rates vary dramatically
from country to country making it particularly important that we con-
sider potential selection bias (Boeckmann et al., 2015). To address this
diﬀerential selection, we use a two-stage Heckman selection correction
approach, which we discuss later (Heckman, 1979).
In addition to human capital and labor supply, the motherhood pen-
alty may be shaped by compensating diﬀerentials (Gash, 2009). To the
extent that mothers trade earnings for jobs that have more family-
friendly characteristics, these characteristics may partially explain the
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motherhood penalty. While one study (Budig & England, 2001) found
no eﬀect of job characteristics on the penalty in the United States, other
work shows the penalty is larger among women in nonprofessional or
nonmanagerial occupations (Budig, 2006). Some scholars argue that
female-dominated occupations are potentially more family-friendly
(Gangl & Zieﬂe, 2009). To examine whether the motherhood penalty
can be explained by a diﬀerential distribution of childless women and
mothers across professional-managerial occupations, or across gender
segregated occupations, we include controls for these factors in some
models. However, these measures are likely to be endogenous to the
model (predicted by number of children a woman has) and are not
included in all estimations.
Yet, even in models that include all of the individual-level factors
discussed earlier, a signiﬁcant penalty persists in many countries in
Europe and North America (Budig & England, 2001; Budig &
Hodges, 2010; Budig et al., 2012; Gangl & Zieﬂe, 2009; Harkness &
Waldfogel, 2003). Possible explanations for this unexplained penalty
among mothers include employer discrimination, lowered productivity,
or in some contexts, inadequate aﬀordable childcare options and the
absence of paid family leave. Correll, Benard, and Paik (2007) provide
evidence of employer discrimination with their experimental research in
the United States, as do Glass and Fodor (2011) with their research
based on interviews of employers and antidiscrimination cases in
Hungary. While our design does not measure employer discrimination,
it does allow us to consider how state interventions may be associated
with the motherhood earnings penalty despite diverse socio-political-
economic contexts. In Figure 2, we show the variation in the size of
the per-child motherhood penalties across the countries we analyze,
estimated using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data.
Figure 2 shows the exponentiated coeﬃcient of the number of chil-
dren from country-by-country Heckman selection models including
covariates for education, age, part-time status, and partnered status.6
Solid bars show signiﬁcant motherhood coeﬃcients, while empty bars
show nonsigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. This graph demonstrates that the per-
child motherhood penalties vary across countries in our analysis. While
we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of the number of children on
women’s earnings in Russia, Australia, and Israel, signiﬁcant per-child
motherhood penalties net of controls remain in a majority of the coun-
tries (with the largest penalties found in continental European countries,
such as West Germany and the Netherlands, and smaller ones in a
number of postsocialist Eastern European countries, but also France
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and even Italy). This suggests that country-level diﬀerences, such as
work–family policy conﬁgurations, may matter for how large an earn-
ings penalty mothers incur, as our analysis will investigate.
Data and Measures
Our study uses data from multiple sources. Individual-level data come
from the Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg (LIS). The LIS is
an excellent source of secondary survey data on households, employ-
ment, and earnings and provides the best cross-national microdata for
comparing income across OECD countries (OECD, 1995). With a few
exceptions, we use Wave 5 (representing the years 2000/2001)7 of the
LIS data for 22 countries. For all countries, the sample is restricted to
employed women, aged 25 to 45 (prime years for childrearing), who are
not self-employed and are not in the military. The total individual-level
sample size is 68,254 women with country samples varying between 545
women in the Austrian data set to 13,544 in the data from the United
States. The median sample size is 1,523. We present sample sizes, the
weighted means, and standard deviations for our individual measures
(for both mothers and childless women) in each country in Table A1 of
the Appendix.
Our dependent variable is the natural log of annual earnings in 2,000
U.S. constant dollars.8 While much of the motherhood penalty research
uses hourly wage as the dependent variable, this measure is not available
broadly or consistently in the LIS data. Clearly, both diﬀerences in
hourly wage rates and hours worked will generate diﬀerences in
annual earnings. To capture the impact of mothers’ greater likelihoods
of working reduced schedules, our models include a measure for part-
time hours. A quantitative measure of work hours is not consistently
available across all countries. Thus, if among full-time workers, women
with fewer children work more excessive overtime hours, the mother-
hood penalty in annual wages may still partially result from unmeasured
diﬀerences in work hours among the full-time workers.
Consistent with past research on the motherhood penalty, our pri-
mary independent variable captures the number of dependent children
coresiding with the respondent (Anderson et al., 2003; Budig &
England, 2001; Budig & Hodges, 2010; Gangl & Zieﬂe, 2009; Staﬀ &
Mortimer, 2012; Taniguchi, 1999; Waldfogel, 1997). One limitation of
LIS data is that it does not include detailed measures of motherhood,
and we cannot draw upon fertility histories. This likely leads to under-
estimation of the per-child penalty because our measure of motherhood
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does not capture the eﬀect of nonresidential oﬀspring on wages. We also
tested alternative speciﬁcations for motherhood include a dummy vari-
able for mother, or separate dummy measures for one-, two-, and three-
plus children. Results were generally robust (results available upon
request). Following general practice in the literature, we present the
ﬁndings with our measure of number of children because it is more
easily interpreted than multiple dummies, which would each require
multiple cross-level interactions.9 The eﬀect of each additional child is
monotonic, though not always perfectly linear in all countries.
Individual-level independent variables include family composition,
human capital and labor supply, and job characteristics. Family char-
acteristics include, in addition to number of children, relationship status
(married or cohabiting¼ 1, otherwise¼ 0). Human capital measures
include educational attainment measured with a dummy variable¼ 1
to indicate tertiary education or specialized vocational education lead-
ing to licensing or other credentials comparable with a college degree.10
We use respondent’s age as a limited proxy for labor market experi-
ence.11 We include a dummy for part-time work, deﬁned as those work-
ing less than 30 hours weekly.12 Some models include job characteristics;
these measures include a dummy variable indicating that the respondent
holds a professional or managerial occupation and the percentage
female of the occupation, derived from aggregated LIS data.13 We
include these measures because past research suggests that mothers
may trade earnings for jobs with family-friendly characteristics (sup-
portive female-dominated jobs or less stressful nonprofessional work;
Budig & England, 2001).
For policy indicators, we use leave and childcare measure from the
work–family policy indicators database (Boeckmann, Budig, & Misra,
2012); taxation policy data come from Florence Jaumotte’s (2003b)
database. The work–family policy indicators database is modeled
after those developed by Gornick and Meyers (2003), Gornick et al.
(1997), and Gauthier and Bortnik (2001). Our database includes 22
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Finland, France, East Germany, West Germany,14 Hungary, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, the Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. We match our policy measures to the LIS survey year for each
country, lagging the measurement of leave policies to 2 years prior to
the survey year.15
We present policy measures for each country in Table A2 of the
Appendix. Childcare policy includes the percentage of children aged 0
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to 2 and the percentage of children aged 3 to 5 in publicly supported
care. Our measure of childcare as the percentage of children enrolled is
the standard measure used by researchers (Gornick & Meyers, 2003;
Gornick et al., 1997; Hook, 2006; Kamerman & Kahn, 1991; Lewis,
2009; Mandel & Semoyonov, 2005, 2006; Pettit & Hook, 2005, 2009)
and shows substantial variation, particularly for children aged 0 to 2.16
For leaves, our measures distinguish between well-paid maternity and
paternity leaves and generally low-paid or unpaid job-protected paren-
tal care leaves that begin after maternity leave is exhausted. We include
only statutory, job-protected leave provisions that can be taken full
time. We see variation in all of our measures, though less so in paternity
leave, which may serve more as a signal of cultural valuation regarding
the importance of father-care and gender equitable care sharing. Of
course, these policy measures capture only access to federal leaves; for
example, some American professional workers have access to leaves
through their workplaces. Yet, our focus is on federal policy, not work-
place policies; in addition, diﬀerential access matters less in other con-
texts, where all workers are covered by federal policy.
Our last policy indicator is a measure of tax disincentives to (married)
women’s employment participation: This measure represents the pro-
portion of the second earners’ income that pays for the increased income
taxes in a dual-earner household where the ﬁrst earner’s wages equals
100% of average production workers’ wages, and the second earner
would go from earning no wages to earning 100% of average produc-
tion workers’ wages as well (Jaumotte, 2003b). While we do not have
data on this measure for Israel, Russia, or the Slovak Republic, we
observe considerable variation among the 19 remaining countries.
Finally, we use a set of country-level control variables to conduct a
robustness analysis of our policy models, which are also included in
Table A2 of the Appendix. These include maternal employment rates,
size of the public sector, and level of overall income inequality as mea-
sured by the Gini coeﬃcient. Public sector employment is from the
International Labour Organization (ILO, 2012).17 All other measures
were calculated based on LIS data.
Methodological Approach
Diﬀerences in the motherhood penalty in earnings across countries
could be due to diﬀerential selection of mothers into employment
across countries. To control for this diﬀerential selection, we use a
two-stage Heckman selection correction approach to estimate the
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inverse Mills ratio (IMR) for inclusion as a selection criterion in our
models (Heckman, 1979). We estimate the IMR prior to estimating our
multilevel models: We ﬁrst estimate separate probit regressions in each
country that predict employment using nonfamily status-based transfer
income,18 other household labor market income (household earnings
from employment minus respondent’s earnings), and presence of a pre-
schooler as selection criteria. Because Heckman corrections can inﬂate
standard errors due to collinearity between the correction term and the
included regressors (Moﬃtt, 1999; Stolzenberg & Relles, 1990),
we include nonfamily transfer income as our instrumental variable
that meets the exclusion restriction (it is not included in the equation
estimating earnings). We argue that the extent to which an individual
can rely on government transfers, as opposed to earnings, for income
should aﬀect her propensity for employment but is unlikely to aﬀect her
earnings if employed. Because we include beneﬁt levels for family-
related transfers in some models, we exclude them from the measure-
ment of this instrumental variable. From the results of these models, we
derive the IMR, which we then include as an individual-level predictor
variable in all multilevel models, as the second step of Heckman’s
correction.
Multilevel modeling enables direct tests of the relationships
between societal-level factors and individual-level eﬀects while simultan-
eously modeling individual and contextual controls, as well as correctly
estimating standard errors with our data where individuals are
nested within countries (DiPrete & Forristal, 1994; Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002).19 Multilevel models estimate the impact of country-level
and individual-level factors simultaneously and can be written as
follows:
Earningsij ¼ 00 þ 10 NUMKID þ 11Zj
NUMKIDþ 01Zj þ 20Xij þ u0j þ rij
where i indices individual women and j indices country. Earningsij rep-
resent log of individual i’s annual earnings in country j. b0j is the inter-
cept, denoting mean earnings. Number of children, and its coeﬃcient
b1j, estimates the average per-child motherhood penalty across all coun-
tries. Xij is the vector of other individual measures (marital status,
human capital, job characteristics, etc.), and b2j is the vector of their
coeﬃcients. rij is the individual-level error term. The g coeﬃcients
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represent country-level coeﬃcients, Zj the vector of country-level meas-
ures (policy and cultural), and uj the country-level residuals. Note that
only the equation for the intercept b0j has an error term, that is, we use
random-intercept models. The coeﬃcient of interest is the cross-level
interaction g11ZjNUMKID, which estimates the relationship between
social policies and the number-of-children slope, that is, the average per-
child motherhood penalty across all individuals in all countries.
We chose random-intercept models as opposed to random-slopes
models due to our limited degrees of freedom at the country level and
because the per-child motherhood penalties are all in the same direction
(the eﬀect in Israel, albeit positive, is close to zero and nonsigniﬁcant as
illustrated in Figure 2).20 All Level-1 covariates are modeled as ﬁxed
eﬀects, assuming that the direction of their eﬀect is the same across all
countries.
Modeling Strategy
To estimate the relationships displayed in Figure 1 and to test our
hypotheses, we use a nested modeling approach. We begin in Model 1
with two variables: the natural log of annual earnings and number of
children. This model shows the total, or gross, eﬀect of children on
earnings and serves as our baseline model. Models 2 and 3 add indivi-
dual-level covariates. Model 2 (and all subsequent models) includes
marital status, age, work hours, education, and the selection control
(IMR). Model 3 adds job characteristics argued to serve as compensat-
ing diﬀerentials for the motherhood penalty; however, we consider these
characteristics to be endogenous to motherhood and earnings and do
not include them in the multilevel models.
Beginning with Model 4, we include country-level measures and their
interactions to examine whether policy indicators shape the motherhood
penalty cross-nationally. Models 4 and 5 test our ﬁrst hypothesis that
childcare should be inversely related to the motherhood wage penalty.
Model 4 adds to Model 2 the measure of 0 to 3 year olds in publicly
funded childcare as a main eﬀect and as an interaction with number of
children, while Model 5 adds the measure for 3 to 6 year olds.
Signiﬁcant and positive interactions of these childcare measures with
number of children would support our ﬁrst hypothesis, as the eﬀect of
children is a negative eﬀect.
Models 6 to 9 are designed to test our second set of hypotheses
regarding leave and the motherhood penalty. Models 6 and 7 include
the number of weeks of paid maternity and paid paternity leave,
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respectively. We predict that these short-term paid leaves will be
inversely related with the motherhood penalty in Hypothesis 2a.
Model 8 tests parental leave generosity, which multiplies level of
pay reimbursement by the length of leave. Model 9 is designed to
test our Hypothesis 2b that predicted that extended parental care
leave (including unpaid leave) would have a curvilinear relationship
with the motherhood penalty. Here, we include number of weeks of
extended leave and its squared term and interact both with the
motherhood penalty.
Model 10 tests our third hypothesis that predicts higher tax penalties
for second earners will correlate with greater motherhood penalties.
Here, we include our measure of the proportion of the second earner’s
wage required to pay additional taxes as a main eﬀect and interact this
with number of children. Finally, Models 11 and 12 include two policy
indicators in the same model to test whether ﬁndings are robust when
tax policy and childcare (Model 11), or tax policy and parental leave
(Model 12) are considered together.
Robustness Analysis
In our ﬁnal analysis, we reestimate all 12 models described earlier and
include other country-level factors that may account for the observed
policy relationships with the motherhood penalty. We ﬁrst include
maternal employment rates as a measure of country-speciﬁc diﬀerences
in employment opportunities for mothers. Women’s labor force partici-
pation is the lowest in Italy and Spain. If, due to positive selection into
the labor force, the mothers more likely to earn less are not in the labor
markets in these countries, we might ﬁnd lower motherhood penalties.
Second, we include a measure of the proportion of workers in a coun-
try, who are located in the public sector. Generally, the public sector is
more likely to enforce work–family policies that could reduce the
motherhood penalty (Nielsen, Simonsen, & Verner, 2004). Third, we
include the Gini coeﬃcient as a measure of income inequality, drawn
from the LIS key ﬁgures. It may be that countries with larger mother-
hood penalties simply have greater overall income disparities, similar to
the impact of income inequality on gender gaps in earnings (Blau &
Kahn, 1992, 1996, 2003; Mandel & Semyonov, 2005). And ﬁnally, in
the robustness analysis, we control for gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita to account for the persistent diﬀerences in overall wealth
especially between the Eastern and Western countries included in our
sample.
138 Work and Occupations 43(2)
Potential Limitations
Our models address endogeneity that may occur, for example, if women
who are more likely to have low earnings are more likely to have chil-
dren, therein reversing the causal order of the logic of the motherhood
penalty from (a) children causing reduced earnings to (b) low earnings
leading to motherhood. While establishing causal order is diﬃcult with
cross-sectional data, we include all available measures of human capital
(education and age, as potential experience), labor supply, and family
composition (including marriage) in our models.
Despite the individual-level control variables included in our models,
unobserved heterogeneity among women within and between countries
may constrain our ability to fully explain variation in the motherhood
penalty and the full eﬀects of policies on this penalty (but see Waldfogel,
1998b, showing that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity does not
lower the motherhood penalty in a cross-national study). For example,
diﬀerences in women’s preferences regarding employment and mother-
hood are unobserved in our data. Cross-sectional data prevent us from
controlling for stable unmeasured heterogeneity through statistical
models, and this is a limitation of our data. However, it is reasonable
to think that family policies, in addition to directly impacting the
motherhood penalty, may also alter the sociopolitical norms regarding
employment among mothers, which, in turn, may change women’s own
preferences and thereby aﬀect the motherhood penalty. Hook (2006)
makes a similar argument about the impact of social policies inﬂuencing
normative gendered behaviors. Similarly, policy contexts may impact
employers’ preferences for hiring and evaluating the work performance
of mothers. To the extent policies change preferences, this kind of unob-
served heterogeneity would be diﬃcult to capture even with longitudinal
data in the absence of measures of preferences. Despite these limita-
tions, our study advances the state of knowledge and leads us closer
to designing future studies to address causality.
A third limitation of our study design is the restricted Level-2 sample
size or that our Level-2 N is limited to 22 countries. Research demon-
strates that multilevel models produce stable coeﬃcients with fewer than
15 macrocases (Quillian, 1995; Raudenbush & Liu, 2000). Indeed, multi-
level models have been used with the LIS data to examine the eﬀects of
welfare policies on the gender gap in earnings for 14 to 20 countries
(Mandel & Semyonov, 2005) and the eﬀects of work–family policies on
women’s employment for 19 countries (Pettit & Hook, 2005). Yet, the
small N increases the chances of a type-2 error (failing to ﬁnd
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signiﬁcance for a nonrandom relationship). This implies that we can
have greater conﬁdence in any signiﬁcant relationships we do ﬁnd; we
are not at risk of misidentifying as signiﬁcant relationships that are not
signiﬁcant, but instead, our risk is of not ﬁnding relationships where
they exist. Due to the small number of Level-2 cases, we do have limited
power to estimate random-slopes models (letting the eﬀect of the
number of children vary across countries); we therefore estimate
random-intercept models, where only average earnings (intercept) is
allowed to vary across countries. Finally, a small N reduces the
number of Level-2 control variables that can be modeled simultan-
eously. Consequently, we do a robustness analysis controlling for
country-level factors by entering them separately. Despite these limita-
tions, multilevel models have been used with the LIS data to examine the
eﬀects of welfare policies on the gender gap in earnings for 14 to
20 countries (Mandel & Semyonov, 2005) and the eﬀects of work–
family policies on women’s employment for 19 countries (Pettit &
Hook, 2005).
Findings
The Earnings Penalty for Motherhood
We begin our series of nested multilevel models with a model that esti-
mates the total eﬀect of the number of children in the household on
earnings. Model 1 of Table 1 shows that the unadjusted average child
eﬀect across countries is statistically signiﬁcant (p5.000) and that
women lose about 15% in annual earnings per child,
(e0.16 1) 100.21 Model 2 adds marital status, human capital charac-
teristics, and accounts for selection into employment by including the
IMR, which reduce the average per-child penalty by 57%, from 15% to
8% (e.088 1), but the penalty remains signiﬁcant. The standardized
coeﬃcients, presented in the Beta column, show that being a part-time
worker has the strongest (negative) association with earnings.22 Because
mothers are far more likely to work part time compared with childless
women, controlling for this variable accounts for a signiﬁcant propor-
tion of the motherhood earnings penalty. Our third model adds job
characteristics, and, consistent with past ﬁndings (Budig & England,
2001), we observe that adding these characteristics does not explain
the child penalty. Because we believe job characteristics are endogenous
to the earnings equation, our next series of models that estimate policy
eﬀects use only human capital and family structure controls.
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The fourth model in Table 1 presents the cross-level interactive eﬀect
between the percentage of children aged 0 up to 3 years who are in pub-
licly funded childcare slots and the per-child penalty. Our ﬁrst hypothesis
posited that the availability of state-provided childcare should reduce the
negative eﬀect of children on women’s earnings by mitigating lost job
experience due to childrearing. The ﬁndings support our hypotheses. In
this model, the main eﬀect for number of children is .101, indicating
that, in a country with no children aged 0 3 years enrolled in publicly
funded childcare, the per-child penalty is 9.6%. The signiﬁcant inter-
action between infant childcare and number of children is positive and
equals .001. This indicates that each additional percentage of infants in
publicly funded care is associated with a .001 decline in log points for the
motherhood penalty. We see in the ﬁfth model, turning to care for older
preschoolers, ﬁndings are similar as for infant care, though weaker in size.
To show the impact of these interacted eﬀects more clearly, Figure 3
presents the per-child association with earnings across the observed
cross-national distribution of the percentage of infants (solid line) and
older preschoolers (dashed line) in publicly funded care. We see that
higher enrollments of 0 to 3 year olds in public childcare are associated
with smaller penalties, reducing the per-child penalty from 9.5% in
countries with only 1% of children in such care to 4.3% in countries
with 41% of infants in publicly subsidized care. We do not extrapolate
outside of our observed values: Sweden, the country with the highest
percentage of infants in publicly funded care, has 41% of infants in
public care.23 Similarly, we see that in countries with the lowest
observed percentage of children aged 3 up to 6 in public care (39%),
the associated wage penalty is 9.5% per child. At the highest levels of
enrollment for this age-group, 99%, the per-child penalty is reduced to
6.8%. That the strength of the associations of older preschooler care
with the motherhood penalty is weaker than that of infant care is not
surprising. In many countries, childcare for this older age-group is part
of the early education system, is more focused on its educational aspects
than its eﬀorts to help families balance work and family demands, and
does not correspond with normal working hours. In summary, our ﬁrst
hypothesis is ﬁrmly supported: Greater levels of childcare for infants
and preschool children are linked to smaller motherhood penalties.
Turning to the impact of family leave, we ﬁrst consider paid leaves:
paid maternity leave, paid paternity leave, and our calculated measure
of weeks of fully funded job-protected parental care leaves. In Model 6
in Table 2, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive interaction between number
of children and weeks of fully paid maternity leave. Figure 4 shows how
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the per-child eﬀect changes by length of paid maternity leave such that,
in countries with 0 weeks of paid maternity leave, the predicted per-child
penalty is 11% and shrinks to 6% per child as paid maternity leave
length increases to 25 weeks. This ﬁnding supports Hypothesis 2a in
stating that paid maternity leaves should be negatively associated with
the size of the motherhood penalty.
Paid paternity leave also shows a signiﬁcant and positive interaction
with number of children, indicating that where paid paternity leave
lengths are greater, the motherhood penalty is smaller. Model 7 of
Table 2 shows the cross-level interactive eﬀect between number of chil-
dren and length of paternity leave. Here, we ﬁnd that the average per-
child eﬀect in countries oﬀering no paid leave to fathers is about 9.2%
per child. The signiﬁcant interaction is positive, however, and shows
that for each additional week of paternity leave, the per-child penalty
declines by about 1.7% points. While this implies that 6 weeks of paid
paternity leave might eradicate motherhood penalties, we urge caution
against interpreting this eﬀect in such a manner. The vast majority of
countries oﬀer no paid paternity leave to men (see Table A2 of
Appendix), and several of those that do oﬀer only a few days. In sum-
mary, we ﬁnd some evidence to support our Hypothesis 2a in regard to
paternity leave, though we caution against overinterpretation of this
evidence.
Next, we consider the eﬀect of our calculated measure for number of
fully funded weeks of leave (weeks of job-protected parental leave times
beneﬁt level). As the cross-level interaction between fully funded leave
length and number of children in Model 8 in Table 2 and Figure 4
shows, weeks of fully funded parental leave also signiﬁcantly impact
the size of the motherhood wage penalty. The per-child penalty in
countries with 0 weeks of funded leave is 9.3%, and this declines to a
minimum of 4.4% in countries with 53 fully funded weeks of parental
care leave.24 Overall, Hypothesis 2a is strongly supported by our ﬁnd-
ings for paid maternity and paid parental care leaves, with some support
for paid paternity leaves as well.
In addition to paid leaves, we also examined the cross-level eﬀects
of the combined duration of job-protected maternity parental care
leave for women with the motherhood penalty. The ninth model in
Table 2 presents the impact of the maximum number of weeks of
women’s job-protected parental leave (and its squared term) on the
per-child penalty for motherhood.25 Here, we test Hypothesis 2b,
which stated that the duration of care leave, regardless of beneﬁt
level, should have curvilinear associations with the motherhood
148 Work and Occupations 43(2)
penalty. The main eﬀect of number of children is signiﬁcant and indi-
cates that in countries with 0 weeks of job-protected leave (though
none exist), the per-child penalty would be roughly 13.2%. The
cross-level statistical interaction between the child penalty and weeks
of leave is signiﬁcant (p .001, two-tailed test) and positive, while the
cross-level interaction between the child penalty and the squared leave
term is signiﬁcant and negative. This indicates a curvilinear relation-
ship, which is best viewed graphically in Figure 5. This ﬁgure shows
how the eﬀect of children on earnings varies by the number of weeks
of leave oﬀered to women as a solid line. The curvilinear pattern is
dramatic and shows that countries with 0 to 49 weeks of job-protected
care leave have very large motherhood penalties (exceeding 6% per
child), as do countries with extremely long leaves, from 157 to 173
weeks (3 or more years). But even the longest leaves are associated
with smaller penalties relative to no leave at all. Leave lengths between
50 and 156 weeks are predicted to be associated with the smaller
motherhood penalties.
In summary, for women, we ﬁnd our Hypothesis 2b supported for
extended care leaves. Countries that allow for very long leaves of
absence (3 or more years) are also associated with high motherhood
penalties, perhaps due to lost human capital or employer discrimination
against long-absent workers. Still, countries with very short leave pro-
visions show the largest motherhood penalties. However, countries that
allow for 2 years of job-protected leave are associated with the smallest
per-child penalties—that are roughly 73% smaller relative to no leave,
perhaps because this leave length strikes the best balance between
mothers’ desires to care for newborns and their desires to return to
employment. While ideally, we would present childcare and leaves
together in the same model, we are not able to do so due to
multicollinearity.
We next consider whether motherhood penalties are larger when
the marginal tax rate of the second earner’s income is higher.
Here, we test Hypothesis 3, which stated that taxation policies that
penalize second earner’s incomes in coupled households should be
related to higher motherhood earnings penalties by encouraging inter-
rupted attachment to the labor market and reduced experience due to
childbearing. Model 10 of Table 3 and Figure 6 show evidence in
support of our third hypothesis: The percentage of the second earn-
er’s income that is needed to pay the additional income tax generated
by that income is signiﬁcantly related to the size of the motherhood
penalty. Countries with the lowest reported marginal tax rates,
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of 23%, show the smallest per-child penalties of 7.9%. Per-child
penalties become larger as the marginal tax rate increases, such
that the highest marginal tax rate of 53% is associated with a
12.2% child penalty.
The level of taxation of the second earner’s income may have
trade-oﬀs with usage of work–family policies, particularly childcare
for very young children and lowly beneﬁtted or unpaid job-protected
leave. To consider whether the relationship of childcare and leave
policy indicators are contingent on second earner tax rates, in
Models 12 and 13 of Table 3, we reestimate our earlier models for
childcare of 0 to 3 year olds and for duration of parental leave by
including taxation rates of second earners. In Model 12, the size and
signiﬁcance of the cross-level interactions between number of children
with childcare for 0 to 3 year olds is unchanged with the inclusion of
the taxation policy, as is the cross-level interaction of taxation with
number of children unaﬀected by the inclusion of the childcare rates
of 0 to 3 s. However, in Model 13, we ﬁnd that the size and signiﬁ-
cance of the cross-level interaction between taxes and number of
children becomes stronger, and the signiﬁcance of leave duration
and children becomes weaker, when we include both measures and
their interactions in the model. This implies that the eﬀects of leave
duration may be partially accounted for by the degree of the tax
penalty for second earners. While the two measures are uncorrelated
in a bivariate analysis, they may be correlated after adjusting for the
eﬀects of other factors in the model and in terms of their joint pre-
diction of the dependent variable (earnings).
To examine this, we reestimated the leave duration model
including the taxation measure as an additive control. Results of
this model are shown in Figure 5. Once we control for the tax pen-
alty on the second earner’s income, that leave duration still shows a
curvilinear relationship where the absence of leave and very
long leaves are associated with larger motherhood penalties, and
the penalties are generally larger and less curvilinear, with the excep-
tion of leave durations of 14 weeks or less being associated with
smaller motherhood penalties when the tax penalty is controlled.
Thus, while the leave duration is less eﬀective at moderating the
impact of children on wages when the tax wedge is included, mother-
hood penalties are greater at almost every level of leave in this
model.
154 Work and Occupations 43(2)
Robustness of Cross-Level Interactions
We examine whether other salient country-level characteristics might
explain the signiﬁcant policy eﬀects on the motherhood penalty estab-
lished in our multilevel models. We thus conduct a robustness ana-
lysis of our signiﬁcant interactions to examine whether the
associations between policies and the child penalties might be due
to country-level diﬀerences in women’s labor force participation,26
the size of the public sector, the level of within-country income
inequality, and the size of the country’s GDP. Table 4 presents the
results from this series of analyses.
The four policy measures are presented in separate panels. The ﬁrst
column of Table 4 replicates results from Tables 1, 2, and 3. In results
columns 2 through 5, we include each of the country-level control vari-
ables successively, in addition to human capital individual-level con-
trols, the country-level policy measure, and its interaction with
number of children. Column 2 includes a measure of women’s labor
force participation for each country. The third column controls for
the size of the public sector in each country, associated both with mater-
nal employment and the likelihood of enforcement of family policies.
The fourth column controls for the Gini coeﬃcient to examine whether
country-level income inequality explains variation in the motherhood
penalty and the eﬀects of policies on this penalty. Finally, the ﬁfth
column controls for each country’s GDP to examine whether the size
of the country’s economic growth is related to the size of the mother-
hood penalty and the eﬀect of work–family policies on this penalty. In
each model, the country-level control is included as a main eﬀect, and
we tested for statistical interactions with number of children. None of
the country-level control variables signiﬁcantly interacted with number
of children, and nonsigniﬁcant interactions were excluded from the
models.
This analysis reveals that our results are robust: In every model,
results for the motherhood penalty and for the cross-level interaction
between the policy indicator and the motherhood penalty are imper-
vious to the inclusion of these country-level controls. Looking ﬁrst at
the eﬀect of childcare for 0 to 3 year olds on the motherhood penalty,
we ﬁnd that none of the Level-2 control variables altered (a) the eﬀect
of children on earnings or (b) the interactive eﬀect between childcare
and number of children. While the main eﬀects of the policy indicator
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(percentage of 0 to 3 year olds in public care) do change across
models, the main eﬀect for the motherhood penalty and its cross-
level interaction with percentage of children in public care is
unchanged.
The robustness checks for the other policy measures (paid leaves,
parental care leave duration, tax policies, and combinations of indi-
cator models) show equally resilient results. None of the control vari-
ables (employment probabilities, public sector, and the Gini
coeﬃcient) signiﬁcantly interacted with number of children.
Moreover, the impact of number of children on earnings, and the
interactions between number of children and the policy measures,
were unaﬀected by the inclusion of the country-level control vari-
ables. We thus conclude that our policy ﬁndings are robust to the
inclusion of these country-level controls.
Discussion
Consistent with our ﬁrst hypothesis, the increased prevalence of publicly
funded childcare for children under the age of 3 and children aged 0 to 3
is signiﬁcantly associated with smaller per-child penalties, despite the
varying policy contexts of the 22 nations in our analysis. Programs for
children under 3 have been explicitly designed to help parents maintain
employment, while programs for children aged 3 to 6 are more often
designed as educational programming in addition to supporting work-
ing parents (Gornick & Meyers, 2003; Kamerman & Kahn, 1991;
Morgan, 2005).27 Similarly, our Hypothesis 2a is conﬁrmed in that
the eﬀects of leave provide evidence in support of our hypotheses that
paid leaves (maternity, paternity, and equivalent fully paid weeks of
parental care) all are inversely associated with the motherhood penalty:
Where these paid leaves are longer, motherhood penalties are smaller.
However, we urge caution in interpreting the eﬀects of paternity leaves,
which are very short. With such little time oﬀered to fathers, we
think it more likely that the presence of paid paternity leave may
signal cultural diﬀerences in the valuation of father involvement with
children and an emphasis on more gender equitable sharing of care.
Indeed, Sweden and Finland are known for their multiple policies
aimed at gender egalitarianism, and paternity leave may be a signal
of a broader regime of equalizing the sexes. In regard to the duration
of extended parental leaves, we ﬁnd a curvilinear relationship as pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 2b: Both the absence of care leaves and very
long leaves for women serve to increase the negative eﬀects of
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motherhood on earnings, while moderate job-protected leaves are
associated with smaller motherhood penalties. Very long extended
leaves may indeed (like short leaves) create trade-oﬀs for women—
but this is not a paradox; such leaves reﬂect gendered cultural ideas
regarding maternal caregiving (Kremer, 2007) that sensibly may be
associated with lower maternal wages.
Consistent with our Hypothesis 3, tax policies also matter. Where the
marginal income tax rate for the second earner captures a greater share
of her earnings, motherhood penalties are larger. Moreover, marginal
second earner tax rates inﬂuence the relationship between leave duration
and the motherhood penalty, such that leave has weaker relationship
with the motherhood penalty in models where we adjust for the second
earner tax rate. Given that this measure is a conservative one—as these
tax rates may inﬂuence employment decisions for childless women as
well as mothers—we suspect that recognizing the inﬂuence of tax poli-
cies may be even more important for understanding gender gaps in
wages.
Importantly, all of our ﬁndings were robust to the inclusion of
other country-level factors. Notably, the Gini coeﬃcient, while having
a negative and signiﬁcant impact as a main eﬀect, failed to alter the
relationship between children and earnings. This is very interesting,
particularly given the important impact of income inequality on
gender gaps in earnings (Blau & Kahn, 1992, 1996, 2003), and sug-
gests that motherhood penalties (as opposed to gender gaps) cannot
be explained or easily attributed to larger economic pressures leading
to earnings inequalities. Our ﬁndings were also robust to alternate
speciﬁcations of motherhood (using one, two, and three or more
child dummy variables) and to combinations of policies (i.e., includ-
ing taxation policies together in models with childcare and leave
policies).
Our ﬁndings help explain the tremendous variation in the mother-
hood penalty, as shown in the enormous motherhood penalties in
West Germany (see Figure 1), as opposed to the much smaller
eﬀect in Sweden, and the insigniﬁcant eﬀect in Israel, controlling
for human capital, labor supply, family structure, and selection into
employment. As shown in Table A2, in West Germany during this
period, only 5% of children aged 0 to 3 were in publicly subsidized
care, as compared with 19% in Israel, or an even larger 41% in
Sweden. Job-protected parental leave length was 64 weeks in Israel
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and Sweden, yet 161 weeks in West Germany. Taxation of the second
earner’s income was also substantially larger in West Germany than
in Sweden. While West German policies have since changed, shifting
to a leave scheme modeled on the Swedish policies, our results make
clear that its previous policies helped exacerbate the motherhood
wage penalty.
On the other hand, it may seem that the United States should have
a larger penalty, given its very low levels of public childcare provisioning
and its very short (12 weeks) job-protected parental leave, which is not
even available to all workers. Yet, U.S. penalties also reﬂect relatively
low taxations rates on the second earner’s income, high rates
of women’s employment, and a low-skill, low-wage market childcare sys-
tem that replaces public childcare, though in ways that sacriﬁce quality
of programming for children and equality among families
(Morgan, 2005).
Conclusions
Our analysis endeavored to accomplish several goals. We aimed to adju-
dicate debates within the literature regarding whether welfare state
interventions create trade-oﬀs. We note that much of this literature
explores diﬀerences between men and women, even though many of
the welfare state interventions are aimed at mothers, rather than all
women. We then focused on explaining diﬀerences among women,
based on how many children they have, to unpack the eﬀects of welfare
state interventions on these diﬀerences—or the motherhood penalty on
wages.
Much previous research on the eﬀects of welfare state interven-
tions has either taken a broad comparative approach—comparing
diﬀerent countries and outcomes (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Gornick
& Meyers, 2003; Orloﬀ, 2002), or created work–family policy indices
to capture overall state interventions (Mandel & Semyonov, 2005,
2006). We examine the relationship between particular policies and
the motherhood penalty cross-nationally, arguing that it is important
to measure policies separately and in ways that best capture their
potential positive or negative eﬀects. This allows us to argue that it
is not that generous welfare states create trade-oﬀs regarding gender
equality but particular policies—such as extended parental lea-
ves—that do so.
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Our research breaks with the tradition of associating ideal welfare
state types with women’s economic outcomes. While this approach
has advanced understandings of welfare states and gender inequities
signiﬁcantly, it cannot disentangle contexts particular to speciﬁc
countries from their policy eﬀects. Our approach reveals that, con-
trolling for individual level diﬀerences, and despite signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in socioeconomic and political settings, some policy eﬀects are
quite robust. For policy makers contemplating which policies might
be most eﬀective at reducing pay inequities, the answer is clear:
Policies that serve to keep women attached to the labor market,
through moderate-length leaves, publicly funded childcare, lower mar-
ginal tax rates on second earner income, as well as support for father
involvement after a birth, appear most eﬀective at reducing the
motherhood penalty.
Overall, we have integrated important insights made by scholars
regarding how welfare state interventions via work–family policies
and aﬀect women’s economic outcomes, as well as the factors that
shape earnings penalties to mothers. By integrating these diﬀerent lit-
eratures, we have been able to explain previously conﬂicting ﬁndings
while identifying the ways in which policies should be constructed to
promote the best outcomes for mothers’ earnings. At their core, we
believe that work–family policies are neither good nor bad—but have
complex eﬀects that relate to the gendered assumptions underlying the
policies (Kremer, 2007). High-quality childcare and moderate paid
leaves support mothers’ employment; long-term care leaves, on the
other hand, help weaken women’s labor force attachment and may
indeed increase employers’ reluctance to hire mothers (Correll et al.,
2007).
In addition, we believe that our ﬁndings have important implica-
tions for understanding gender inequality as well as motherhood
penalties. Over time, earnings for childless men and women have
been converging; yet, earnings for mothers and fathers remain signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent in many countries. This means that unpacking
the sources of inequality between mothers and childless women (as
well as between fathers and childless men as in Glauber, 2007;
Hodges & Budig, 2010) is an important step toward fully unpacking
the sources of gender inequality. Future research should explicitly
consider the degree to which parenthood generates observed gender
earnings gaps.
162 Work and Occupations 43(2)
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
T
a
b
le
A
1
.
W
e
ig
h
te
d
M
e
an
s
an
d
St
an
d
ar
d
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
(i
n
P
ar
e
n
th
e
se
s)
fo
r
In
d
iv
id
u
al
-L
e
ve
l
V
ar
ia
b
le
s.
N
N
o
.
o
f
ch
ild
re
n
N
at
u
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
an
n
u
al
e
ar
n
in
gs
M
ar
ri
e
d
/
C
o
h
ab
it
in
g
A
ge
P
ar
t-
ti
m
e
st
at
u
s
H
ig
h
e
r
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
at
ta
in
m
e
n
t
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
/
M
an
ag
e
ri
al
w
o
rk
e
r
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
w
o
m
e
n
in
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
A
u
st
ra
lia
1
,4
4
1
1
.9
7
4
N
A
9
.3
8
7
9
.8
1
6
0
.8
4
0
0
.6
6
6
3
6
.6
3
5
3
2
.2
8
2
0
.4
8
4
0
.1
2
0
0
.1
9
4
0
.3
3
1
0
.2
2
9
0
.3
6
2
0
.5
8
1
0
.5
7
0
(0
.8
0
3
)
(0
.7
2
2
)
(0
.5
3
2
)
(0
.3
6
7
)
(0
.4
7
2
)
(5
.1
3
2
)
(5
.4
4
7
)
(0
.5
0
0
)
(0
.3
2
5
)
(0
.3
9
5
)
(0
.4
7
1
)
(0
.4
2
1
)
(0
.4
8
1
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
(0
.1
8
7
)
A
u
st
ri
a
5
4
5
1
.6
5
9
N
A
8
.9
3
8
9
.5
3
2
0
.8
5
4
0
.5
5
9
3
6
.3
0
1
3
3
.2
7
0
0
.4
1
4
0
.0
8
0
0
.1
2
1
0
.3
0
3
0
.0
6
3
0
.1
8
7
0
.5
7
8
0
.5
5
7
(0
.6
8
9
)
(0
.7
4
0
)
(0
.5
7
2
)
(0
.3
5
3
)
(0
.4
9
8
)
(5
.6
5
6
)
(6
.1
6
9
)
(0
.4
9
3
)
(0
.2
7
2
)
(0
.3
2
7
)
(0
.4
6
1
)
(0
.2
4
4
)
(0
.3
9
1
)
(0
.1
6
0
)
(0
.1
4
9
)
B
e
lg
iu
m
8
1
2
1
.9
3
9
N
A
9
.4
3
3
9
.6
3
9
0
.8
7
4
0
.5
9
4
3
6
.9
4
5
3
2
.1
2
3
0
.3
1
4
0
.1
5
7
0
.4
4
7
0
.5
5
4
0
.2
3
2
0
.2
0
9
0
.5
9
5
0
.5
6
9
(0
.8
5
2
)
(0
.7
5
3
)
(0
.5
4
7
)
(0
.3
3
3
)
(0
.4
9
2
)
(5
.1
7
3
)
(5
.9
4
4
)
(0
.4
6
5
)
(0
.3
6
5
)
(0
.4
9
8
)
(0
.4
9
8
)
(0
.4
2
3
)
(0
.4
0
8
)
(0
.1
5
8
)
(0
.1
7
4
)
C
an
ad
a
8
,1
4
1
1
.9
2
1
N
A
9
.3
3
2
9
.6
6
4
0
.8
4
2
0
.5
8
1
3
6
.8
8
0
3
3
.6
3
0
0
.2
4
9
0
.1
2
2
0
.1
7
6
0
.3
0
9
0
.1
9
1
0
.2
1
8
0
.6
3
3
0
.6
1
2
(0
.8
3
3
)
(1
.1
5
2
)
(0
.9
5
8
)
(0
.3
6
4
)
(0
.4
9
3
)
(5
.4
1
7
)
(6
.2
6
9
)
(0
.4
3
2
)
(0
.3
2
7
)
(0
.3
8
1
)
(0
.4
6
2
)
(0
.3
9
3
)
(0
.4
1
3
)
(0
.2
1
6
)
(0
.2
2
0
)
C
ze
ch
R
e
p
u
b
lic
6
,9
0
7
1
.8
2
9
N
A
8
.0
8
8
8
.2
7
1
0
.8
7
3
0
.6
2
1
3
7
.0
4
6
3
4
.3
8
9
0
.0
4
4
0
.0
4
0
0
.0
9
3
0
.1
8
6
0
.0
7
9
0
.1
4
6
0
.6
2
5
0
.6
0
7
(0
.6
7
8
)
(0
.5
8
3
)
(0
.5
2
4
)
(0
.3
3
3
)
(0
.4
8
5
)
(5
.4
5
7
)
(7
.0
7
4
)
(0
.2
0
4
)
(0
.1
9
5
)
(0
.2
9
1
)
(0
.3
8
9
)
(0
.2
7
0
)
(0
.3
5
3
)
(0
.1
9
3
)
(0
.2
0
8
)
Fi
n
la
n
d
2
,7
5
2
1
.9
5
7
N
A
9
.3
4
7
9
.5
2
6
0
.8
5
5
0
.6
2
5
3
7
.0
4
1
3
2
.6
9
7
0
.0
8
8
0
.0
8
1
0
.1
9
9
0
.2
6
1
0
.2
1
7
0
.2
7
0
0
.6
7
8
0
.6
6
8
(0
.8
8
8
)
(1
.0
4
9
)
(0
.9
1
0
)
(0
.3
5
2
)
(0
.4
8
4
)
(5
.2
8
0
)
(6
.2
8
4
)
(0
.2
8
3
)
(0
.2
7
3
)
(0
.4
0
0
)
(0
.4
4
0
)
(0
.4
1
2
)
(0
.4
4
4
)
(0
.1
9
9
)
(0
.2
1
1
)
Fr
an
ce
2
,7
2
3
1
.8
2
6
N
A
9
.0
8
6
9
.3
1
5
0
.8
5
6
0
.5
4
7
3
6
.5
1
8
3
2
.3
1
6
0
.2
5
0
0
.1
3
0
0
.1
6
1
0
.3
5
4
0
.1
9
6
0
.2
8
0
0
.6
9
1
0
.6
4
3
(0
.8
0
2
)
(0
.8
6
9
)
(0
.7
5
3
)
(0
.3
5
1
)
(0
.4
9
8
)
(5
.4
5
6
)
(6
.2
5
7
)
(0
.4
3
3
)
(0
.3
3
6
)
(0
.3
6
7
)
(0
.4
7
8
)
(0
.3
9
7
)
(0
.4
4
9
)
(0
.2
2
2
)
(0
.2
2
8
)
E
as
t
G
e
rm
an
y
7
6
2
1
.5
7
1
N
A
9
.3
2
6
9
.3
0
6
0
.8
1
1
0
.4
7
3
3
6
.9
7
6
3
2
.2
4
4
0
.1
8
7
0
.1
6
4
0
.3
7
3
0
.4
0
4
0
.1
1
6
0
.1
2
2
0
.6
7
2
0
.6
6
4
(0
.6
7
3
)
(0
.9
2
7
)
(1
.1
0
7
)
(0
.3
9
1
)
(0
.5
0
1
)
(5
.2
0
1
)
(6
.2
6
7
)
(0
.3
9
0
)
(0
.3
7
1
)
(0
.4
8
4
)
(0
.4
9
2
)
(0
.3
2
0
)
(0
.3
2
9
)
(0
.2
2
5
)
(0
.2
4
3
)
W
e
st
G
e
rm
an
y
2
,4
6
6
1
.7
5
5
N
A
8
.9
5
5
9
.8
2
5
0
.8
3
2
0
.5
8
8
3
7
.2
7
1
3
3
.7
7
1
0
.5
2
3
0
.1
3
7
0
.2
0
8
0
.3
0
5
0
.0
6
4
0
.1
9
5
0
.6
7
4
0
.6
3
5
(0
.8
0
6
)
(1
.1
0
2
)
(0
.8
2
5
)
(0
.3
7
4
)
(0
.4
9
2
)
(5
.1
2
4
)
(5
.9
4
4
)
(0
.5
0
0
)
(0
.3
4
4
)
(0
.4
0
6
)
(0
.4
6
1
)
(0
.2
4
4
)
(0
.3
9
6
)
(0
.2
1
9
)
(0
.2
2
8
)
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
163
T
a
b
le
A
1
.
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
)
N
N
o
.
o
f
ch
ild
re
n
N
at
u
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
an
n
u
al
e
ar
n
in
gs
M
ar
ri
e
d
/
C
o
h
ab
it
in
g
A
ge
P
ar
t-
ti
m
e
st
at
u
s
H
ig
h
e
r
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
at
ta
in
m
e
n
t
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
/
M
an
ag
e
ri
al
w
o
rk
e
r
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
w
o
m
e
n
in
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
H
u
n
ga
ry
4
0
6
1
.8
0
8
N
A
7
.2
9
5
7
.6
0
4
0
.9
0
3
0
.5
9
1
3
6
.7
7
4
3
3
.6
7
7
0
.0
8
4
0
.0
5
6
0
.2
0
2
0
.2
8
8
0
.1
9
2
0
.2
3
5
0
.7
8
6
0
.7
0
9
(0
.7
4
2
)
(0
.9
6
6
)
(0
.7
4
1
)
(0
.2
9
6
)
(0
.4
9
6
)
(5
.3
8
8
)
(6
.5
9
1
)
(0
.2
7
7
)
(0
.2
3
2
)
(0
.4
0
2
)
(0
.4
5
7
)
(0
.3
9
5
)
(0
.4
2
8
)
(0
.2
1
7
)
(0
.2
3
8
)
Ir
e
la
n
d
6
4
0
2
.2
1
4
N
A
9
.2
2
3
9
.8
1
0
0
.8
6
8
0
.6
2
5
3
6
.5
2
2
3
0
.9
5
7
0
.3
7
8
0
.1
8
4
0
.2
1
7
0
.5
0
6
0
.1
5
3
0
.3
3
2
0
.6
2
6
0
.5
9
0
(1
.0
2
4
)
(0
.8
7
3
)
(0
.7
5
7
)
(0
.3
3
8
)
(0
.4
8
6
)
(5
.2
8
2
)
(4
.6
5
6
)
(0
.4
8
5
)
(0
.3
8
9
)
(0
.4
1
2
)
(0
.5
0
2
)
(0
.3
6
0
)
(0
.4
7
3
)
(0
.1
5
4
)
(0
.1
7
3
)
Is
ra
e
l
1
,4
0
8
2
.4
0
1
N
A
9
.4
3
8
9
.5
1
5
0
.8
8
7
0
.5
6
0
3
5
.8
6
3
3
0
.8
9
3
0
.2
5
0
0
.1
6
9
0
.4
1
3
0
.7
0
3
0
.1
7
1
0
.3
1
5
0
.5
7
5
0
.5
6
0
(1
.2
8
2
)
(0
.7
5
3
)
(0
.8
0
8
)
(0
.3
1
6
)
(0
.4
9
8
)
(5
.6
5
2
)
(5
.7
7
1
)
(0
.4
3
3
)
(0
.3
7
6
)
(0
.4
9
3
)
(0
.4
5
8
)
(0
.3
7
7
)
(0
.4
6
6
)
(0
.1
6
7
)
(0
.1
5
5
)
It
al
y
1
,1
7
0
1
.6
5
9
N
A
9
.1
0
0
9
.2
6
2
0
.9
1
0
0
.6
2
9
3
7
.7
6
3
3
4
.6
5
1
0
.2
8
4
0
.1
6
4
0
.1
3
4
0
.2
6
9
0
.1
4
3
0
.1
5
2
0
.4
3
7
0
.4
3
2
(0
.6
6
6
)
(0
.5
9
9
)
(0
.4
2
2
)
(0
.2
8
7
)
(0
.4
8
4
)
(4
.8
5
6
)
(5
.7
5
3
)
(0
.4
5
1
)
(0
.3
7
1
)
(0
.3
4
1
)
(0
.4
4
4
)
(0
.3
5
0
)
(0
.3
6
0
)
(0
.1
3
4
)
(0
.1
3
7
)
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
6
6
6
1
.7
1
4
N
A
9
.2
4
3
1
0
.0
0
9
0
.8
6
9
0
.5
9
0
3
6
.3
8
9
3
2
.3
6
9
0
.4
3
7
0
.0
7
0
0
.2
2
6
0
.4
8
4
0
.1
1
0
0
.2
7
0
0
.6
3
5
0
.5
2
8
(0
.7
6
1
)
(0
.9
8
4
)
(0
.4
7
9
)
(0
.3
3
8
)
(0
.4
9
3
)
(5
.2
5
9
)
(5
.7
6
4
)
(0
.4
9
7
)
(0
.2
5
6
)
(0
.4
1
9
)
(0
.5
0
1
)
(0
.3
1
4
)
(0
.4
4
5
)
(0
.1
9
9
)
(0
.2
1
1
)
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s
1
,6
0
6
1
.9
3
1
N
A
9
.2
5
1
9
.9
2
2
0
.9
1
6
0
.6
8
0
3
6
.4
0
5
3
2
.3
6
3
0
.7
0
2
0
.1
3
7
0
.2
4
6
0
.4
4
5
0
.3
8
9
0
.3
6
1
0
.6
6
1
0
.5
9
1
(0
.7
7
4
)
(0
.9
8
1
)
(0
.6
1
5
)
(0
.2
7
8
)
(0
.4
6
7
)
(5
.2
2
4
)
(5
.6
8
2
)
(0
.4
5
8
)
(0
.3
4
4
)
(0
.4
3
1
)
(0
.4
9
7
)
(0
.4
8
8
)
(0
.4
8
1
)
(0
.1
9
4
)
(0
.2
1
7
)
P
o
la
n
d
6
,4
1
9
1
.8
4
2
N
A
7
.9
8
7
8
.1
9
3
0
.8
8
1
0
.4
5
5
3
6
.9
7
8
3
2
.5
2
7
0
.0
8
2
0
.0
5
9
0
.2
4
8
0
.5
5
3
0
.2
0
6
0
.3
9
7
0
.6
2
6
0
.6
3
8
(0
.8
5
8
)
(0
.5
5
8
)
(0
.5
8
1
)
(0
.3
2
4
)
(0
.4
9
8
)
(5
.5
5
9
)
(6
.4
9
0
)
(0
.2
7
4
)
(0
.2
3
5
)
(0
.4
3
2
)
(0
.4
9
7
)
(0
.4
0
4
)
(0
.4
8
9
)
(0
.1
8
5
)
(0
.1
6
8
)
R
u
ss
ia
8
2
0
1
.5
8
1
N
A
5
.9
8
0
6
.2
1
8
0
.8
1
6
0
.5
5
3
3
7
.0
3
8
3
6
.4
6
2
0
.0
7
2
0
.0
4
8
0
.2
4
9
0
.3
6
4
0
.2
5
9
0
.3
1
3
0
.8
0
5
0
.7
3
0
(0
.6
8
4
)
(1
.0
2
2
)
(1
.0
0
8
)
(0
.3
8
8
)
(0
.5
0
0
)
(5
.6
2
4
)
(7
.0
5
6
)
(0
.2
5
9
)
(0
.2
1
4
)
(0
.4
3
3
)
(0
.4
8
4
)
(0
.4
3
8
)
(0
.4
6
6
)
(0
.2
3
2
)
(0
.2
3
4
)
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
164
T
a
b
le
A
1
.
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
)
N
N
o
.
o
f
ch
ild
re
n
N
at
u
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
an
n
u
al
e
ar
n
in
gs
M
ar
ri
e
d
/
C
o
h
ab
it
in
g
A
ge
P
ar
t-
ti
m
e
st
at
u
s
H
ig
h
e
r
e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
at
ta
in
m
e
n
t
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
/
M
an
ag
e
ri
al
w
o
rk
e
r
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
w
o
m
e
n
in
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
M
o
th
e
r
C
h
ild
le
ss
Sl
o
va
k
R
e
p
u
b
lic
5
,1
8
7
2
.0
7
1
N
A
7
.2
5
7
7
.4
4
1
0
.9
0
4
0
.4
8
4
3
6
.3
3
7
3
6
.1
8
9
0
.0
3
7
0
.0
0
8
0
.1
1
4
0
.2
0
7
0
.1
2
5
0
.2
0
3
0
.6
4
4
0
.6
2
0
(0
.8
2
2
)
(0
.5
2
0
)
(0
.4
2
1
)
(0
.2
9
5
)
(0
.5
0
0
)
(5
.4
5
2
)
(6
.1
9
0
)
(0
.1
8
9
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.3
1
8
)
(0
.4
0
5
)
(0
.3
3
1
)
(0
.4
0
2
)
(0
.1
9
2
)
(0
.2
1
3
)
Sp
ai
n
9
2
3
1
.7
4
1
N
A
8
.7
9
2
8
.9
9
0
0
.9
2
4
0
.7
9
0
3
6
.6
5
6
3
0
.9
7
8
0
.1
9
1
0
.1
1
5
0
.2
6
6
0
.3
6
2
0
.1
9
5
0
.2
2
2
0
.5
7
4
0
.5
4
1
(0
.7
5
4
)
(1
.0
5
1
)
(0
.8
3
6
)
(0
.2
6
5
)
(0
.4
0
8
)
(5
.2
1
2
)
(4
.6
3
2
)
(0
.3
9
3
)
(0
.3
2
0
)
(0
.4
4
2
)
(0
.4
8
1
)
(0
.3
9
7
)
(0
.4
1
6
)
(0
.1
4
8
)
(0
.1
4
6
)
Sw
e
d
e
n
3
,6
0
6
1
.9
8
5
N
A
9
.3
2
8
9
.5
9
1
0
.8
1
5
0
.3
9
8
3
6
.3
5
5
3
2
.1
6
7
0
.2
9
7
0
.2
4
3
0
.1
6
2
0
.2
7
7
0
.0
9
2
0
.1
2
9
0
.5
5
3
0
.5
3
4
(0
.8
5
8
)
(1
.1
4
4
)
(0
.9
9
7
)
(0
.3
8
8
)
(0
.4
9
0
)
(5
.2
7
2
)
(6
.2
5
7
)
(0
.4
5
7
)
(0
.4
2
9
)
(0
.3
6
8
)
(0
.4
4
8
)
(0
.2
8
9
)
(0
.3
3
5
)
(0
.1
5
1
)
(0
.1
3
1
)
U
K
5
,5
8
2
1
.9
1
8
N
A
9
.4
1
0
1
0
.1
5
0
0
.8
3
3
0
.7
3
2
3
6
.8
6
7
3
3
.0
8
9
0
.5
1
2
0
.0
8
3
0
.1
4
6
0
.3
4
3
0
.1
6
4
0
.3
1
6
0
.5
8
5
0
.5
5
5
(0
.8
1
9
)
(0
.9
1
7
)
(0
.6
2
0
)
(0
.3
7
3
)
(0
.4
4
3
)
(5
.2
6
4
)
(5
.9
9
3
)
(0
.5
0
0
)
(0
.2
7
6
)
(0
.3
5
3
)
(0
.4
7
5
)
(0
.3
7
1
)
(0
.4
6
5
)
(0
.1
7
1
)
(0
.1
8
2
)
U
n
it
e
d
St
at
e
s
1
3
,5
4
4
1
.9
9
0
N
A
9
.7
5
5
1
0
.1
2
6
0
.7
7
7
0
.5
8
4
3
6
.3
5
7
3
4
.4
6
0
0
.1
4
3
0
.0
6
0
0
.2
4
8
0
.4
4
2
0
.3
0
9
0
.4
3
5
0
.6
6
1
0
.6
1
0
(0
.9
6
5
)
(1
.0
3
6
)
(0
.9
0
3
)
(0
.4
1
7
)
(0
.4
9
3
)
(5
.6
1
2
)
(6
.3
3
6
)
(0
.3
5
0
)
(0
.2
3
7
)
(0
.4
3
2
)
(0
.4
9
7
)
(0
.4
6
2
)
(0
.4
9
6
)
(0
.2
3
6
)
(0
.2
3
8
)
165
T
a
b
le
A
2
.
C
o
u
n
tr
y-
L
ev
e
l
M
e
as
u
re
s.
%
o
f
0
to
3
ye
ar
o
ld
s
in
p
u
b
lic
ly
su
p
p
o
rt
e
d
ch
ild
ca
re
a
%
o
f
3
to
6
ye
ar
o
ld
s
in
p
u
b
lic
ly
su
p
p
o
rt
e
d
ch
ild
ca
re
a
N
o
.
o
f
w
e
e
k
s
o
f
fu
lly
p
ai
d
m
at
e
rn
it
y
le
av
e
a
N
o
.
o
f
w
e
e
k
s
o
f
fu
lly
p
ai
d
p
ar
en
-
ta
l
le
av
e
a
M
ax
im
u
m
n
o
.
o
f
w
e
e
k
s
o
f
jo
b
-
p
ro
te
ct
e
d
le
av
ea
N
o
.
o
f
w
e
e
k
s
o
f
p
at
e
rn
it
y
le
av
e
a
T
ax
at
io
n
o
f
se
co
n
d
e
ar
n
e
r’
s
in
co
m
e
(1
0
0
%
o
f
A
P
W
)b
%
W
o
m
e
n
e
m
p
lo
ye
d
c
%
W
o
rk
e
rs
e
m
p
lo
ye
d
in
p
u
b
lic
se
ct
o
rd
G
in
i
co
e
ff
ic
ie
n
te
G
D
P
p
e
r
ca
p
it
a
in
cu
rr
e
n
t
U
.S
.
d
o
lla
rs
f
A
u
st
ra
lia
1
3
4
1
0
0
5
2
0
3
2
6
5
1
6
.3
1
7
1
9
,0
5
3
A
u
st
ri
a
8
7
7
1
6
2
4
8
5
0
2
9
7
5
2
7
.2
5
7
2
4
,1
9
4
B
e
lg
iu
m
2
0
9
9
1
2
4
2
8
0
.6
5
3
7
8
3
1
.2
7
9
2
2
,6
2
3
C
an
ad
a
5
5
3
8
6
2
5
0
3
6
7
6
1
9
.3
1
5
2
3
,5
5
9
C
ze
ch
R
e
p
u
b
lic
1
7
6
1
9
3
2
1
6
2
0
3
0
7
6
2
2
.2
5
9
6
,0
1
1
Fi
n
la
n
d
2
4
6
6
1
2
3
7
1
6
1
3
3
4
7
0
2
7
.2
4
6
2
3
,5
4
3
Fr
an
ce
2
2
9
9
1
3
5
3
1
5
9
0
.6
2
6
7
2
3
0
.2
7
8
2
2
,5
4
7
E
as
t
G
e
rm
an
y
3
4
8
7
1
4
1
3
1
6
1
0
5
3
7
8
2
3
.2
3
1
2
3
,1
1
4
W
e
st
G
e
rm
an
y
5
7
5
1
4
1
3
1
6
1
0
5
3
6
7
2
2
.2
8
0
2
3
,1
1
4
H
u
n
ga
ry
1
0
8
8
2
4
7
3
1
5
9
0
3
0
7
1
3
7
.2
9
2
4
,6
9
2
Ir
e
la
n
d
4
5
6
1
0
0
1
4
0
3
1
6
2
1
8
.3
1
3
2
5
,3
1
3
Is
ra
e
l
1
9
7
9
1
0
0
6
4
6
N
A
6
1
1
7
.3
4
6
1
8
,4
2
3
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
166
T
a
b
le
A
2
.
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
)
%
o
f
0
to
3
ye
ar
o
ld
s
in
p
u
b
lic
ly
su
p
p
o
rt
e
d
ch
ild
ca
re
a
%
o
f
3
to
6
ye
ar
o
ld
s
in
p
u
b
lic
ly
su
p
p
o
rt
e
d
ch
ild
ca
re
a
N
o
.
o
f
w
e
e
k
s
o
f
fu
lly
p
ai
d
m
at
e
rn
it
y
le
av
ea
N
o
.
o
f
w
e
e
k
s
o
f
fu
lly
p
ai
d
p
ar
e
n
-
ta
l
le
av
e
a
M
ax
im
u
m
n
o
.
o
f
w
e
e
k
s
o
f
jo
b
-
p
ro
te
ct
e
d
le
av
ea
N
o
.
o
f
w
e
e
k
s
o
f
p
at
e
rn
it
y
le
av
ea
T
ax
at
io
n
o
f
se
co
n
d
e
ar
n
e
r’
s
in
co
m
e
(1
0
0
%
o
f
A
P
W
)b
%
W
o
m
e
n
e
m
p
lo
ye
d
c
%
W
o
rk
e
rs
e
m
p
lo
ye
d
in
p
u
b
lic
se
ct
o
rd
G
in
i
co
e
ff
ic
ie
n
te
G
D
P
p
e
r
ca
p
it
a
in
cu
rr
e
n
t
U
.S
.
d
o
lla
rs
f
It
al
y
6
8
5
1
8
8
4
8
0
3
9
5
2
1
6
.3
3
3
1
9
,2
6
9
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
4
6
8
1
6
2
3
4
2
0
.4
2
8
6
7
1
1
.2
6
0
4
6
,2
7
7
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s
6
6
8
1
6
0
1
6
0
4
0
7
6
2
5
.2
3
1
2
6
,0
3
3
P
o
la
n
d
2
3
9
1
8
0
1
7
3
0
3
7
6
6
2
9
.5
0
7
6
,6
2
0
R
u
ss
ia
2
1
6
4
2
0
1
2
1
6
5
0
N
A
8
0
3
8
.4
3
4
1
,7
7
5
Sl
o
va
k
R
e
p
u
b
lic
9
7
8
2
5
3
6
1
6
1
0
N
A
7
5
4
4
.1
8
9
2
,2
1
5
Sp
ai
n
5
7
7
1
6
0
1
6
1
0
.4
2
3
5
2
2
6
.3
3
6
1
4
,4
2
1
Sw
e
d
e
n
4
1
8
6
7
5
0
6
4
2
3
4
8
6
3
4
.2
5
2
2
7
,2
8
6
U
K
1
7
1
8
0
1
8
0
2
4
6
9
1
9
.3
4
7
2
4
,9
9
3
U
n
it
e
d
St
at
e
s
6
5
3
0
0
1
2
0
3
0
7
3
1
6
.3
6
8
3
4
,6
0
0
N
ot
e.
A
P
W
¼
av
e
ra
ge
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
o
rk
e
rs
’
w
ag
e
s;
G
D
P
¼
gr
o
ss
d
o
m
e
st
ic
p
ro
d
u
ct
.
a
B
lin
d
e
d
.
b
Ja
u
m
o
tt
e
(2
0
0
3
b
).
c
A
u
th
o
rs
’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
b
as
e
d
o
n
L
IS
d
at
a.
d
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
L
ab
o
r
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
an
d
au
th
o
rs
’
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
b
as
e
d
o
n
L
IS
d
at
a.
e
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
rg
In
co
m
e
St
u
d
y,
ke
y
fig
u
re
s.
f O
E
C
D
(2
0
1
2
).
167
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conﬂicts of interest with respect to the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no ﬁnancial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Notes
1. We discuss both the total, or gross, motherhood penalty and the residual, or
net, penalty, meaning what remains after adjusting for the mechanisms
known to produce the penalty. The gross penalty is important empirically
and substantively because it reveals the full extent of earnings inequality
associated with motherhood. The residual penalty may result from unob-
served mechanisms, such as lowered productivity or employer
discrimination.
2. While Mandel and Semyonov (2005) estimate supplementary models with
separated measures for childcare and maternity leave, their article primarily
focuses on a combined policy index. We extend the separate policy models
approach begun in their work.
3. Maternity leave and paternity leave refer to birth-related leave typically
accompanied by earnings-related benefits, while parental leave stands for
longer leaves, typically job-protected with lower benefits or unpaid that
enable parents to care for young children.
4. Including level and progressivity of income taxes, tax deductions for depen-
dent spouses and children, joint or individual taxation of married couples,
or income thresholds for social security contributions.
5. In many countries, cohabitation is akin to marriage. We include cohabiters
as married couples.
6. We use Heckman regression models addressing the problem of estimating
the effects of covariates on an outcome where respondents may be system-
atically selected into the group for which the outcome variable is observed.
In the first step, we predict women’s employment participation among all
women using a dummy variable indicating the presence of a preschooler,
household income excluding the woman’s income, and nonfamily transfer
income. The second stage of the Heckman model adjusts for each respon-
dent’s differential likelihood of employment in its estimation of how pre-
dictor variables in the main model are associated with earnings (Heckman,
1979).
7. Because Wave 5 data are not available or are of poorer quality, we use
Wave 4 data for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic and Wave
6 data for Poland.
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8. We use average annual exchange rates and consumer price index conversion
factors (Sahr, 2001) to convert national currencies into U.S. dollars in year
2000. We also estimated models using earnings in national currencies, which
had no effect on the fixed-effects coefficients. Because the conversion
reduces the spread of the earnings distributions, the standard errors tend
to be smaller in the models using logged 2,000 U.S. dollars. Finally, we also
estimated models using within-country earnings percentile rankings
(Mandel & Semyonov, 2005, 2006); this corrects for different levels of earn-
ings dispersions across countries but did not change results.
9. Results were robust for the one-, two- and three-plus child dummy vari-
ables. While effects were not linear, they were monotonic, with higher
numbers of children associated with larger wage penalties. Given the
many interactions between number of children and country-level measures
in our models, we simplify by using number of children rather than child
dummy variables.
10. National survey data harmonized by LIS vary in the level of educational
attainment detail. Following LIS, we used ISCED Levels 5 and 6 as an
initial guideline to create the variable indicating high educational attain-
ment but also used information on national education systems from each
country to make decisions, particularly in cases where the national data do
not map well onto the ISCED¼ 97 coding scheme.
11. While not an ideal measure of experience, this is commonly used when
actual work experience is lacking (see Filer, 1993; Stewart, 2000).
12. In Finland, direct weekly hour measures are unavailable, though numbers
of weeks worked full time and part time are available. If a respondent spent
a majority of the weeks in part-time employment, he or she was coded as
part-time employed. In the Slovak Republic and Poland, the part-time
measure represents self-reported part-time status.
13. The measure of professional-managerial status is based on codes in the
1,000s and 2,000s in the International Standard Classification of
Occupations ISCO-88 if available in the original survey. When these
codes were unavailable, we derived as close an approximation as possible.
14. We examine former East and West Germany separately, due to the persis-
tent differences in employment patterns and different policy legacies
(Rosenfeld, Trappe, & Gornick, 2004).
15. Of course, it is likely that the lagged effect is longer, given our measurement
of motherhood. Without longitudinal individual-level data, however, we
believe this is the best approach to take.
16. Government policies related to the provision of childcare are hard to cap-
ture because policies for children of a specified age-group often do not
correspond to the actual delivery of services due to financial or ideological
barriers (Plantenga & Remery, 2009). We therefore follow standard practice
in the literature and employ a measure of service usage. For a discussion of
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the challenges of creating cross-nationally comparative childcare enrollment
measures, see Eurostat (2004) or Rostgaard and Fridberg (1998).
17. ILO data were supplemented by authors’ own calculations based on LIS
data where ILO data were unavailable.
18. Nonfamily transfer income includes social insurance benefits (disability,
sickness, unemployment), social assistance, or military or veteran’s benefits,
as well as regular cash transfers from family or relatives or charitable orga-
nizations. This measure excludes child-related benefits (child allowances,
family benefits, maternity or parental leave benefits, alimony or child sup-
port). Because the reference period is the year prior to the survey, the receipt
of unemployment benefits does not perfectly predict employment status in
the survey week.
19. We use restricted maximum likelihood to estimate our models because
restricted maximum likelihood provides less biased random-effects esti-
mates than full maximum likelihood, especially in models with fewer
Level-2 cases. The two methods produce the same fixed-effects estimates
(Luke, 2004; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).
20. In contrast to random-slopes models, random-intercept models do not esti-
mate the relationship between country-specific motherhood penalties and
policies, but they recognize that individuals are embedded in different
(country) contexts that may shape women’s and mothers’ employment
decisions.
21. Exponentiated coefficients can be interpreted as the percent change in
annual earnings associated with a one child increase in the number of
children.
22. Because standardizing coefficients in multilevel models poses problems with
regard to the standard deviations used to calculate Beta coefficients, parti-
cularly where cross-level interactions are involved, we provide only standar-
dized coefficients for models including individual-level covariates only.
23. Because Sweden is an outlier on this policy measure, in results not shown,
we top-coded Sweden to the next lower observed value and reestimated the
models to ensure Sweden was not driving our findings. Results remained
significant, in the same direction, and even slightly larger in size.
24. In results not shown, we included both paid maternity leave and fully
funded parental care leave in the same model, results for both were robust.
25. Findings for the combination of maternity plus parental care leaves are
equivalent to the results presented for parental care leaves alone.
26. In results not shown, we tried alternate specifications of labor force parti-
cipation including mothers’ employment rates, women’s full-time employ-
ment rates, mothers’ full-time employment rates, and women’s and mothers’
employment probabilities (generated by a logistic model using presence of a
preschooler, education, age, and other household income and its square as
predictors). Results were robust across all specifications, so we opted for the
simplest specification (women’s employment rates). We also ran models
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excluding the IMR to check whether the presence of both women’s employ-
ment rates (country-level measure) and the IMR (individual-level measure
capturing selection into employment) impact the size of the cross-level inter-
action. Findings are robust with the exception of the interaction between
childcare enrollment of 3 to 6 year olds and the motherhood penalty that is
not significant.
27. Programs for 3 to 6 year olds vary in the daily number of hours and annual
number of days children are in care. With a measure including the number
of hours of care per year for 3 to 6 year olds, we might find stronger effects.
Lewis (2009) provides the percentage of children in care (public or private)
for 30 or more hours a week based on EU-SILC data, but for only a subset
of the countries used in our analysis.
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